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Introduction 
The focus of the article is the connection between the production in the present of 
particular memories of the past and the ability to frame present-day conflicts in terms of 
particular or universal claims and transformation projects. Through referring to past 
struggles and their outcomes, the process of framing will clarify what renders certain 
possibilities legitimate while excluding others. This connection between past and 
present realities, memories and struggles will appear in the reading of past struggles in 
terms of heroism or defeat, and in the way of incorporating those memories into 
present-day struggles in positive or negative terms.  These different and interrelated 
processes express interlinked and diverse forms of dispossession that are simultaneously 
shaped by and contribute to shape the possible spaces and scales in which struggle can 
be meaningfully waged. 
My attempt here is to analyze a particular case, in an industrial corner of Europe, trying 
to unveil the processes of definition and framing of conflict, the setting of the 
contending field of force, the design of the battlefield where struggle will be waged. 
This process is in itself part of the struggle, waged both in discursive terms and in 
material ones. On the one hand, tensions and contradictions in the way people access 
resources of different kinds (economic, political and symbolic) produce cleavages in 
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terms of spaces and identities of contention, but they are also the grounds for producing 
instruments that can help unify pluralities of experience. On the other hand, the 
construction of a wider collectivity appears as an oriented process, that is: it has a 
purpose, one that addresses subjects in their projection into the future (their livelihood, 
their career, their family life, their children, their retirement, their pension). The time 
dimension is thus embedded in the struggles to gain control over one’s life in a plurality 
of levels: the more proximate level traces connections between past and present 
generations of concrete people (parents and children, mentors and pupils); an 
intermediate level traces connections between institutions, between the past and the 
present of organized groups; finally, there is a more abstract plane which traces 
connections at the structural level, between past and present logics of systemic 
reproduction, between logics of historical development. These connections between past 
and present at different levels of abstraction, in turn, enable people to operate at 
different spatial scales and result in different types of impact. This is how memory is 
expressed in practice, and how it gets involved in a very real sense in the framing of 
present-day struggles, and the defining of projects for the future. I will pursue these 
issues based on my recent fieldwork in Ferrol, an industrial town in Galicia (North 
Western Spain). 
I started fieldwork in the town of Ferrol (A Coruña) in 2003, and I am still working 
there to date. Ferrol has the doubtful honor of having been the birthplace of General 
Franco, who re-named it after his glorious crusade as “Ferrol del Caudillo”. However, 
very few people in Spain know that it was also the birthplace of Pablo Iglesias, the 
founder of the Spanish Socialist party (founded in 1870). This is symbolic of a space of 
tensions, where the military (the Navy) and the shipyard workers have simultaneously 
confronted and cooperated with each other, starting in the eighteenth century. What 
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attracted me to Ferrol was precisely the tension that emerged so powerfully during the 
Franco regime (1939-1975): On the one hand, the outmost expression of the regime’s 
repressive might, the military;2 on the other, the outmost expression of working class 
struggles, the organized workers of the Empresa Nacional Bazán, the nationalized 
shipyards. By the early 1970s the public military shipyard (Bazán) and the initially 
private commercial shipyard (Astano) employed some 20,000 workers and provided a 
living wage in almost every household. The definition of this industry as “strategic” and 
key to developing the strength of the nation resulted in stable, relatively well paid 
employment for the male population, which in turn produced a strong, well organized 
working class movement. 
Through the experiences, practices and narratives of different generations of workers in 
Ferrol I would like to address the following general issue: What kinds of collectives 
need to be produced in order to achieve a radical transformation of capitalist relations of 
production and a substantively democratic political space? In order to answer this 
question, however, it is necessary to try and understand how common emancipatory 
projects and solidarity links might be discovered or created by ordinary people who are 
constantly faced with two kinds of work: the everyday work of earning a livelihood and 
imagining a future for their children, and the work of fighting to change a reality of 
hardship and uncertainty. This duality in turn relates to different forms of engaging 
struggle: through an immediate claim for resources and targeted changes –particular 
interests and claims, linked to direct experience—on the one hand, or through a long 
term organized force towards structural transformation in the general interest, on the 
other. It therefore refers to the immanent tension between the particular experience of 
dispossession and the more abstract argument (or category) that enables the 
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communication and sharing of it, and eventually the construction of a larger structure –a 
theory-- where the particular position makes sense and which should be transformed.  
Experience, abstraction, struggles and theories 
This tension was repeatedly underlined by Raymond Williams in several political essays 
(1989) when trying to make sense of what the struggle for socialism had to be in the 
present (late twentieth century). His analysis was based on the case of Britain’s 
developments (e.g. the Thatcher reforms, the miners’ strike, the gradualism of the 
Labour Party and its abandonment of a real socialist transformation) and on his 
experience as a border person, having been raised in a small community in South Wales 
later to go on to one of the centers of abstract thinking (Cambridge). It is from this 
border position that he explained two different kinds of feelings of responsibility, two 
different modes of “community”: a) one linked to a [rural] place and to immediate 
proximity, to the ”recognition of certain kinds of mutual responsibility” and of “a level 
of social obligation which was conferred by the fact of seeming to live in the same place 
and in that sense to have a common identity” and b)  another one [industrial] linked 
with more abstract forces which nevertheless had concrete, and place-bound effects: “a 
community that had been hammered out in very fierce conflict, the kind of community 
that was the eventual positive creation of struggles within the industrialization of South 
Wales.” (1989 [1977]:114). For Raymond Williams, however, present day historical 
realities forced the need of abstraction and a politics of negation (of immediate 
experience) that came with it: 
“Something had happened which put certain of the basic elements of our 
social life beyond the reach both of direct experience and of simple 
affirmation, affirmation followed by extension. In came, necessarily, the 
politics of negation, the politics of differentiation, the politics of abstract 
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analysis. And these, whether we liked them or not, were now necessary even 
to understand what was happening. (…) New characteristic social relations 
which have, in a sense, to be discovered, not only by factual enquiry but by 
very complex interpretation, discovering all kinds of new systems and 
modes. And these things which are the determining tendencies in modern 
history can be put into conflict with those other affirmative notions which, 
whether they come from older kinds of rural communities or from militant 
working-class communities, are always more closely tied to experience. 
And around them still centres the notion of community, contrasted now to 
what? Often I found, as this argument continued, contrasted with ‘real 
politics’ or ‘practical politics’.” (1989 [1977]:116)  
What appears then is that, often, these more abstract realities are pictured as “real 
politics” or “practical politics”, that is, the politics of the organizations (mainly the party 
and unions) and confronted to the politics tied to “communities”. It is this tension 
between the real weight of abstraction in our lives, and the immediacy of experience 
that Williams sought to capture in the dialectics of affirmation (experience, community, 
the extension of community) and negation (distance, abstraction, practical politics) in 
the struggle for socialism. The process of “negation” (the method of abstraction) was in 
itself a part of the hegemony of capitalism, and had not yielded the expected results 
(through Labour party politics), but the process of simple community “affirmation” (the 
method of experience and place proximity) was also inadequate for the struggle to be 
successful: 
“we have learned all too harshly and bitterly the truth of these latest phase, 
the phase of negation, the phase of knowing that you have to go beyond the 
simple community, the phase of the quick identification  of enemies, the 
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phase also of very conscious and prolonged political abstraction. If we 
merely counterpose to that the forms of a simpler kind of politics, I very 
much doubt if we shall engage in the central struggle. On the other hand, if 
that negative politics is the only politics then it is the final victory of a mode 
of thought which seems to me the ultimate product of capitalist society. 
Whatever its political label it is a mode of thought which really has made 
relations between men into relations between things or relations between 
concepts. And yet to re-establish the notion of politics as relationships 
between men, to re-establish the ideas of community politics, would mean 
superseding, going beyond, that kind [117] of politics rather than merely in 
turn negating it.” (1989 [1977]:117-118). 
In a very central way, this became the issue that had to be resolved for orienting and 
waging a successful struggle for a different –a socialist—society. It is in this mind 
frame that he developed his concept of “militant particularism” that I will be engaging 
with in this chapter. The concept tries to deal with this tension, which is also the tension 
of defining a project that can be shared. It points to the need to find the general interest 
in the particular interests of communities struggling for a better life: the question of 
survival of particular communities becomes not a special case but a general case, 
reviving the labor movement by driving at the general interest through the particular 
claims of, for example, the mining communities in the 1980s (1989 [1985]:125-127). 
Instead of negating the particular through a superior set of abstract concepts defining the 
general interests of the “economy” or the “nation”,  
“the unique and extraordinary character of working-class self-organization 
has been that it has tried to connect particular struggles to a general struggle 
in one quite special way. It has set out, as a movement, to make real what is 
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at first sight the extraordinary claim that the defence and advancement of 
certain particular interests, properly brought together, are in fact in the 
general interest. That, after all, is the moment of transition to an idea of 
socialism.” (1989 [1981]:249).  
However, it is the struggle for that moment of transition to the idea of socialism that has 
been largely lost by working-class organizations today and needs to be reconstructed 
through a “necessary and workable settlement between particular interests and the 
general interest” (1989 [1981]:254). For Williams the problem with Labour in its 
institutional forms (party, union) has been their transformation into “part of the 
mechanism of a modern capitalist society” (1989 [1981]:250).  Only the immediate 
experience of particular interests has preserved the truth of the socialist version of the 
general interest, “yet not consciously, not at the level of argument, only really at the 
level of feeling, of mood” (1989 [1981]:254). It is , then, from this position that “the 
concept of a practical and possible general interest, which really does include all 
reasonable particular interests, has to be negotiated, found, agreed, constructed.” (1989 
[1981]:255). In the end, in Williams’ view, both the “affirmative” aspect of experience 
in immediate struggles, and the abstract intellectual “negation” of distanced analysis 
were necessary to construct “in convincing detail (…) the general shape of the new 
social order” (1989 [1981]:255). 
This debate, however, was a political one in which academics in the left were trying to 
make sense of the actual role of institutions that were meant to represent working-class 
interests (Labour party, the unions), the significance of new social movements 
appearing in the 1960s and 1970s (anti-Vietnam war, civil rights movement, feminist 
movement, environmental movement) and the substance of class as a category and a 
praxis defining a collective movement. The debate, of which Williams was part, 
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expressed a dissatisfaction over the formal institutions of Labour and a need to 
understand new forms of conflict within capitalist societies. In the wake of the systemic 
turn of the 1970s, after the termination of the Bretton Woods system and the 
liberalization of exchange and financial markets that ensued, Labour institutions became 
increasingly co-opted in what was described as neo-corporatist regimes, based on 
agreement seeking through institutional negotiation within the existing social 
framework, instead of seeking a total transformation of the system through sustained 
conflict and an idea of socialism. For those involved in the debates the issues were: 1) 
was class an abstract category or was it a praxis?, 2) what was the articulation between 
experience (immediate struggles) and formal organizations (political struggles), 
between particular and general interests?, 3) and what was the link between concrete 
and abstract understandings of class position (structures of feeling, class 
consciousness)? The thread connecting these different questions was the tension that 
Williams tried to confront between the concrete and the abstract in the lived experience 
of class, but also the need to incorporate this duality (concrete/ abstract) in any 
organization that really expressed the interests of the dispossessed. E.P. Thompson 
discredited French Marxist structuralism for understanding class as an abstract 
structural category (in the Poverty of Theory, 1978), and proposed instead an 
understanding of class that was tied to concrete collective action and struggles, that 
would eventually build up a culture of class, were social situations would acquire a 
shared meaning (Thompson 1966). Hobsbawm’s (1984 [1971]) position was, on the 
contrary, that:  
“class has two levels of aspiration (…) the immediate, day-by-day specific 
demands and the more general demands for the kind of society which suits 
it” (:26). “Working class consciousness at both levels implies formal 
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organization; and organization which is itself the carrier of class ideology, 
which without it would be little more than a complex of informal habits and 
practices” (:27). “‘Socialist consciousness’ through organization is thus an 
essential complement of working-class consciousness. But it is neither 
automatic nor inevitable” (:28). “The necessary mediation of organization 
implies a difference, (…) a divergence, between ‘class’ and ‘organization’, 
i.e. on the political level, ‘party’. The further we move from the elementary 
social units and situations in which class and organization mutually control 
one another –e.g. in the classic case, the socialist or communist union lodge 
in the mining village—and into the vast and complex area where major 
decisions about society are taken, the greater the potential divergence” 
(1984 [1971]:28).  
What Hobsbawm stresses also through the historical example of “The Making of the 
Working Class 1870-1914” (1984 [1981]) in a direct critique of Thompson is that 
organizations (mass unions, Labour party) are central to the development of class 
consciousness, and of class as a collective force and as a movement with direction. 
Organizations are also key in training and framing the leaders that emerge in concrete 
mobilizations during immediate struggles, but they also produce particularly formalized 
kinds of leaders for institutional aims (1984 [1981]: 210). As different from 
spontaneous and reactive forms of protest by subaltern groups, class becomes a subject 
of history only when it is formalized. However, often organizations acquire dynamics of 
their own tied to long-term perspectives of their institutional social reproduction that 
might get in the way of effective mobilization in the interest of ordinary workers  (1984 
[1977]:293).  What the organizations of the left provide is their capacity to produce 
policies and bodies capable of implementing them from within the system (1984 [1977]: 
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295). It is both Thompson and Hobsbawm’s positions that Williams tried to supersede 
through retaining the contradiction between concrete and abstract, particular and 
general, immediate and organized struggle as central to the socialist idea and project. 
 
These various strands of theory have in common their central preoccupation with the 
possible forms of struggle, with trying to understand what makes oppressed and 
exploited people come together, how they attempt to transform their situation in a 
durable way, and in what direction, following what design of a society. Struggle has 
often been defined as the necessary process by which spaces of possibility are opened 
for those that were excluded from them. It is the means toward increased inclusion in 
the polity and in civil society. Struggles attempt to force participation through 
confrontation and mobilization that may push towards the transformation of the rules 
that frame social interaction. Struggle is about conflict and about how conflict is 
defined. William Roseberry, in his “Hegemony and the language of contention” pointed 
to the fact that “unity is [for both the ruling and the subaltern classes] a political and 
cultural problem” (1994:359). It is in the light of this central problem that hegemony 
appears as a process of construction of the languages, contours, and practices of 
struggle, in an always changing confrontation between dominant and subaltern subjects. 
However, as Roseberry reminds us, “The concept’s value for Gramsci [when trying to 
understand the failure of the Piedmont bourgeoisie to lead and form a unified nation-
state] lay in its illumination of lines of weakness and cleavage, of alliances unformed 
and class fractions unable to make their particular interests appear as the interests of a 
wider collectivity” (:365). For anyone observing the situation of subaltern classes in 
Europe, the issue of cleavages emerging as against union, is central. For anyone even 
remotely interested in changing the direction of the distributive structure, not to mention 
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a more profound transformation, it becomes imperative to analyze what are the 
conditions of possibility of struggles being waged today in Europe. What I will trace in 
this article is the connection between the historical production of shared identities and 
particular collectives of struggle –militant particularism--, and the experienced structure 
of present-day capitalism in an industrial town in Southern Europe.  
 
In Ferrol, as elsewhere in Europe, the issue is to think through the processes people 
engage in and the instruments that people develop in their struggle to try and control 
their lives. What we see emerge from the ethnography, however, is that these processes 
are disharmonious and contradictory, and do not produce unity or orientation in and of 
themselves. I want to address this through the exploration of three axes that emerge 
from my fieldwork and explain the construction of structures of feeling: history, the 
understanding of a logical structure to the development of events in the past leading to 
the present; suffering, as a psycho-physical fact and interpretation of the position of the 
self in the real world; and collective identity, as a constructed means to make sense of, 
and interact with, forces that appear too impersonal and abstract to be dealt with 
otherwise. In this particular location, industrial Ferrol, these axes are locally depicted as 
“defeat”, “suffering” and “struggle”. Defeat describes an understanding of the 
Transition from Franco’s dictatorship to parliamentary democracy (1975-1982) in terms 
of hopes and expectations of socialism that were disappointed. Suffering expresses the 
embodiment of workers’ work experience, of mobilization and repression and of the 
recognition of defeat. Struggle tells about collective action aimed at transforming the 
existing situation into a better one; about hope and project for a better future in the 
general interest.  Memory emerges as the bridge that enables people to link these 
different scales, define projects and stabilize boundaries for struggle.  
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Defeat, suffering, and struggle 
History 
The aftermath of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) transformed the realities of making 
a living for everyone in the country. The industrial town of Ferrol had a past of socialist, 
communist and anarchist working class organizations before the war which resulted in a 
strong repression after Franco’s victory. However, the importance attributed to the 
shipyards by the regime had the somewhat paradoxical effect of creating a strong and 
organized working class movement.  
The impact of the nationalist economy policies of the early Franco regime, favored an 
import substitution program  that aimed at strengthening the country’s industrial base. 
The regime became a peculiar mix of repression and paternalism for the working classes 
(Babiano 1993). Repression was extreme during the war in the areas under the control 
of the “National” francoist army and during the first ten years after the Civil War ended 
(1939-1949). It included summary executions, prison, concentration camps and work 
camps, together with systematic encouragement of denunciations of republicans or 
“reds” and continuous surveillance by the police of the conduct and political affinities 
of citizens.  It also implied massive purges in private and public workplaces of workers 
that had mobilized for the Republic or the Revolution and against the Francoist 
“National” rebels. In the private industry, purges applied mostly to workers that were 
imprisoned or in exile as a result of the conflict. In the public sector, a law-decree 
(Decreto-ley) of 25th August 1939 reserved 80% of employment in the civil service to 
“ex-combatants, disabled veterans, ex-prisoners of war, orphans and kinspersons of the 
‘fallen’” in the National side during the war (Riquer 2010:153).   At the same time, 
employers were legally forbidden to dismiss workers for economic reasons3 without 
government permission and had to pay a strong indemnity while workforce minimums 
were statutory, established and enforced for all firms by the government. While 
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protecting male employment the National Catholic regime obstructed female 
employment especially after marriage.  Strikes were illegal and severely repressed, free 
unionization was forbidden, salaries were tightly controlled, inflation deteriorated their 
value and rationing provided scarcely at controlled prices while black market prices 
rocketed (Molinero & Ysàs 1993, Molinero 1990; Vilar 2004; Riquer 2010). 
Employment stability became the programmatic hallmark of labor relations during the 
regime and produced a system of internal labor market where sons entered as 
apprenticeships in their fathers’ firms, especially in the large strategic industries. This 
was coupled with a closing of the labor market to women whose main calling was 
defined as housework. 
The participation of the state in heavy industries grew constantly until the end of the 
regime in 1975 and continued growing through the restructuring of the early 1980s until 
the privatization years in the 1990s.4 In relation to economic policies, two different 
periods of trade closure can be defined in the first twenty years after the Civil War, 1) 
Autarky (Falangista, model of self-sustaining economic autonomy) (1939-1946) 2) 
Import substitution (1946-1959), aimed at developing industry in order to achieve 
competitiveness. This second period led to gradual liberalization after 1953 and the 
Madrid treaties with the United States. The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (later World Bank) wrote a report on Spain (1963) prescribing the 
articulation of monetary stabilization policies, liberalization of trade and foreign 
investment, deregulation of labor market, while it opened the aid credit. It can be said 
that starting in 1959 the economic policies of the Spanish francoist governments 
(referred to as “technocrats”) follow the model of development that the US had exported 
to the rest of Western Europe after World War II (WWII). However, this liberalization 
model was compatible with state intervention intended to regulate the excesses of the 
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market but not to substitute for it. “Indicative planning” was a model of economic 
regulation that initiated in France after WWII linked to post-war reconstruction, but 
which had intellectual antecedents both in right wing corporatist ideas as well as in 
soviet socialist central planning of the inter-war period (Ramos Gorostiza & Pires 
Jiménez 2009). One of its major proponents was Jean Monnet one of the founders of the 
European Economic Community (EEC). It was mostly meant as a technical device 
based on macroeconomic data (input-output tables, national accounting) that would 
enable economic actors to make rational decisions. The state’s role was to gather and 
make available this macroeconomic information and to coordinate the national economy 
and its different sectors in relation to long-term economic development targets. The 
state’s intervention had to interfere minimally with market forces, but it had to make 
decisions as to which “sectors” of the economy should receive incentives because they 
were thought to represent the ground base of any further development. Spain following 
the French model of “Development Plans” centered in strong key industries (steel, 
energy, shipbuilding) that would be given preference by the state. Indicative planning 
was a model widely discussed by European nations after WWII, and it had the 
acquiescence of the US reconstruction planners. In its 1963 report, the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development supported the adoption of “indicative 
planning” as a way to liberalization and economic development for Spain. The results of 
development plans for Spain in the 1960s decade have been strongly criticized by 
Spanish economists on various grounds, however, mostly stressing their inefficiency 
and constraints to full liberalization (Ramos Gorostiza & Pires Jiménez 2009).  
Indicative planning did have two fundamental consequences that are central for the 
discussion in this chapter. First, it introduced a particular technical language into 
economic practice, one that seemed to supersede the political language that had infused 
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economic thinking and decisions up to that moment (Falangista, Socialist, Communist, 
Anarchist). Macroeconomic data were to be the guides of economic policies and they 
appeared as devoid of political intention while the group of economists that came to 
power with that project were aptly called “the technocrats”, foreshadowing the 
neoliberal arguments for a politics of austerity today.5 Macroeconomic arguments 
would eventually become such a hegemonic force as to pervade the discourse of 
democratic trade unions putting an end to the revolutionary aspect of unions that had re-
emerged during the Franco regime (Martínez-Alier & Roca Jusmet 1988). Second, 
indicative planning, through favoring the key sector industries that were also those that 
could benefit from economies of scale and Fordist modernization, gave workers in these 
industries a job that was protected not only through labor laws but also through longer-
term economic policies. Indeed, the articulation of production and consumption that is 
the hallmark of Fordist organization, trading stable employment and better wages for 
increased productivity, which creates a simultaneous rise in demand and supply and a 
dream of middle class aspirations, was tied in Spain to the “strategic” industries and 
framed in a context of repression. Some of these industries had been nationalized (such 
as the military shipyards) but those that were private also benefited from special state 
support and protection. As a result, workers’ position was strengthened within these 
sectors and eventually enabled the reconstruction of class based trade unions. 
These modernizing plans were undertaken by the victorious side of a Civil War that had 
been mostly a Class War, aimed at the suppression of alternative (socialist, anarchist) 
models of political economic organization, and in an environment of absolute political 
repression. Liberalization of the economy was a first step and signaled the regime’s 
intention of siding with the “free” world in the polarized environment of the Cold War. 
Nevertheless, if the aim at integration with western international powers was to become 
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a reality some political gestures toward democratization should be forthcoming.6  
During the “development” decade (1960s), government intervention was progressively 
reduced and committees representing workers within large (over 500 workers) firms 
became legal within the framework of the corporatist “vertical” national union. The 
turning point appeared with the Ley de Convenios Colectivos (Law of Collective 
Agreements) of April 1958 that established the legality of economic –as distinct form 
political—collective action as part of the process of negotiation of workers with firms. 
In the following years the institutional framework of labor committees enabled workers 
to legally organize and voice collective claims (Sánchez Recio 2002).  These worker 
committees, democratically elected by workers, negotiated in-firm collective 
agreements with representatives of the enterprises and under state supervision. After 
1965 “economic” strikes were de-penalized although unions will remain illegal until 
Franco’s death in 1975. During this period, the argument of “modernization” was 
central to the liberal political economists (most of them members of the Opus Dei 
Catholic congregation7) in Spanish Governments from 1957 up to 1982 and the advent 
of the socialist party to power (Viñas 2003, González 1979, Anderson 1970, Graham 
1999). 
In the Ferrol shipyards, a sustained expansion of demand conjuncture until the early 
1970s provided male jobs and decent wages from one generation to the next and 
reinforced the effects of state protection to a “strategic” industry. Both state intervention 
and a favorable market conjuncture contributed to stabilize workers expectations. Stable 
employment lasted until the early 1980s and was crucial in the re-emergence of a 
clandestine but very active class based trade union (Comisiones Obreras, CCOO) in the 
early 1960s. Many today speak of that past situation of shipyard workers as one of 
privilege, but it was the result of a particular historical conjuncture and of struggle. It 
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was the organization of the labor movement in class terms within the “vertical” 
corporatist union of the francoist regime, by a coalition of social Catholic, Communist 
and Anarchist groupings, that enabled workers in the “strategic” industries to better 
their salaries and work conditions. Annual collective bargaining became established in 
all sectors of heavy industry by the early 1960s. Often these were moments of strikes 
and violent confrontation that developed a particular male identity centred on values of 
justice, struggle and solidarity among peers. Clandestine union leaders were in and out 
of prison continuously during the 1960s and early 1970s.   In Ferrol, in early March 
1972 the negotiation of a collective agreement resulted in numerous strikes and 
demonstrations that were severely repressed leading to the death of two workers and 16 
wounded on the 10th, while more than 100 strikers were put under arrest, 60 imprisoned 
and 160 disciplinary redundancies occurred. Those involved  in the organization of the 
movement were put in the black list. In commemoration of this, March 10th became 
instituted as the day of the Galician worker. The shipyard union became the model for 
the entire working class in Ferrol and was very active at organizing other local industrial 
struggles. 
After transition to democracy, the first socialist government of president Felipe 
González initiated re-structuring of all national state industries preparing Spain for 
incorporation into the European Economic Community and the free market challenge of 
competitivity. Complying with demands from Brussels, the shipyards were brutally 
downsized. From 1984 to 1987 thousands of jobs were lost; unemployment and early 
retirement became a generalized feature in the region. While the economic rationale for 
restructuring was generally accepted by unions as the “need” to transform what was 
admitted to be an inefficient industrial system resulting from the state intervention 
policies of the preceding regime, workers asked for better conditions of severance and 
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unemployment coverage, as well as guarantees that new industries would be developed 
in the old industrial areas. Labor conflict increased during those restructuring years and 
unions succeeded in obtaining better overall conditions for those made redundant, but 
this appeared to many as a trade off for becoming a new type of union, a “responsible” 
union in the context of Europe, in fact explicitly abandoning the revolutionary path. 
During the Transition period the unions had become progressively bureaucratized after 
the Moncloa agreement (Pacto(s) de la Moncloa, 1977) and generally compliant with 
the macroeconomic technical projections of the economists, their growth objective, 
competitive arguments and European integration interest. The Pacto de la Moncloa was 
a political agreement to stabilize the economy, signed by the major political parties 
(including the communist party and Catalan and Basque nationalist parties) on October 
1977. It had the tacit support of the unions and rested on the shared objective of making 
the transition to democracy possible. The “Raison d’État” of the political transition and 
the fear of involution appeared to all as a strong argument for the agreement. In a 
conjuncture of high inflation (27%) the Moncloa agreement was aimed at containing 
salaries and increasing productivity to enhance competitivity and stimulate growth. The 
practice of “agreements” between employers, workers’ unions and the state has since 
become strongly instituted in Spanish economic policy. 
The early Transition years (1975-1976) had seen the power of the unions increase8 and 
openly express (through strikes and demonstrations) both political objectives 
(democracy, free unions, legalization of the Communist party) and labor and social 
issues (salaries on a mobile scale, better working conditions, social benefits). This had 
resulted in a progressively better distribution of work rents to capital rents in the GDP 
up to 1977, with real salaries following the increases in productivity. From then on, 
work rents would decrease steadily as a result of salaries stagnating or even decreasing 
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while productivity continued to increase (Martínez-Alier & Roca Jusmet 1988: 52; 
Zaragoza & Varela 1990:61, Gutiérrez 1990: 122-26). The Pacto de la Moncloa, and all 
the subsequent agreements that were subscribed by unions9 and employers under the 
supervision of the State, had as their main objective wage contention in order to control 
inflation and foster economic recuperation (Zaragoza 1990). The politics of 
“agreement” [concertación] between the different agents of the economy have been 
described as neo-corporatist because they implied the loss of a revolutionary objective 
and the incorporation of trade unions into the neoliberal policies of democratic 
governments: “neo-corporatist structures also assimilate politics to the economy in 
another sense, because macroeconomic orientations become the basis of social 
agreements” (Martínez-Alier & Roca Jusmet 1988:59).10 The process of cooptation of 
labor conflict by the technical guidelines of macroeconomic planning pursued the way it 
had initiated during the technocratic governments of the Franco regime. This situation 
produced an hegemony that would frame industrial worker’s protest and struggles in a 
particular “language of contention” (Roseberry 1994) that was that of the dominant 
groups but appeared to be neutral, technical and universal:  
“The macroeconomic reasoning and objectives, which appear a lot more 
neutral [than traditional corporative ideologies] might better serve the aim 
of getting trade union leaders to accept ‘social peace’ and convince their 
followers, so long as they abandon the Marxist or anarcho-syndicalist 
language and start discussing about how much should the inflation rate be 
reduced or how much should the GDP increase.” (Martínez-Alier & Roca 
Jusmet 1988: 56) 
This trend of technical reasoning and justification has continued until the present, 
through various moments of re-structuring and job loss in the 1990s and 2000s that have 
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seen how workers’ struggles were driven towards negotiation and agreement by the 
unions.  
By 2009 the structure of the shipyard industry in Ferrol had become a flexible one 
relying on a network of subcontracting auxiliary firms. Parallel to this transformation, 
the region has experienced the increase of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME) 
mostly in textile and garment manufacturing and in service sectors, in new industrial 
parks surrounding the town of Ferrol (such as Narón). These “new” jobs are addressed 
to women and younger people and are highly volatile and unprotected. Little 
unionization or collective action mark this new area of employment where a stronger 
sense of individual strategizing and networking is the main instrument of social 
mobility. In economic terms there is a demise of the traditional “fordist” shipyard 
industry and an emergence of a “flexible” regionally integrated structure of SME. For 
most people job precariousness and career instability render prevision for the future 
very difficult. Migration to the big cities of Madrid, Barcelona or London has soared for 
young people in this region in the last ten years as they attempt to find better 
opportunities in urban centers. Today, Ferrol is the town in Spain with the second 
largest emigration rate, and over a third of its households live from a state subsidy, often 
that of an older generation that accessed early retirement in the re-structuring struggles 
of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. 
 
Defeat 
The concept of defeat appeared during my fieldwork associated with the understanding 
of experiences related to the Transition and the restructuring years. It produced a 
particular framework for capturing the logic of the present in relation to the events of 
the past. This reasoning of historical experience was one of the aspects entangled in the 
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local structures of feeling of the working class that enable or inhibit solidarity and 
mobilization. 
Early in my fieldwork (2003), in a debate around memories of the past and political 
activism organized by a cultural association in Ferrol, Raúl,11 one of the leaders of the 
working class movement of the 1960s and 1970s, said: 
“[in the 1960s] anarchists, communists and socialists had different 
experiences [of the Republic and Civil War period] it was very difficult to 
make them agree... [We had to do] invisible underground work in order to 
produce the new working class movement out of all these different opinions. 
Many have contributed to this final result: to bring the dictatorship to an 
end.” (R., 2003).  
This is a very succinct statement of what seems to have been one of the grounds for 
overcoming cleavages in the past: the fight for democracy. In the same meeting 
however, several people started voicing what would become a leitmotiv throughout 
these years: that the fight had, in the end, been lost.  
There was a sense of defeat, their defeat as the working class and as the “left”, but also a 
defeat of a particular idea of democracy, that of popular sovereignty going beyond 
institutional forms. And both these aspects were linked, because, as Raúl declared in 
2010 “the War [Civil War] was lost by the working class, not by the Republic”. The aim 
in recuperating democracy was to widen the spaces of struggle for the working class, 
the spaces of solidarity, of respect and of hope. The generation now in their 70s feels 
they were deceived by political leaders: “We became orphans of the left, we gave 
everything, we believed in people who today are not on our side” (L., 2003). Prominent 
leaders of the left during the transition came into power in 1982 only to conduct 
industrial restructuring and destroy thousands of jobs in Ferrol. The expectations of 
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democracy were misleading, remarks María, an activist woman: “We thought that 
through voting for those parties we believed in, they would be doing the work [for us], 
but that did not happen. We made ourselves comfortable; we thought that we didn’t 
have to keep fighting, because they were there to do the job.” (M., 2005). Here, she 
expresses a perception that the fault lay also with the working class for abandoning their 
active participation in the hands of formal institutions such as parties and unions. By 
legalizing unions and parties, channels for conflict expression were constitutionally 
regulated: “democracy” not only produced the demobilization of the working class it 
produced a profession out of political activism, and a “realist politics”. Union and party 
representatives became “experts” in “politics”, distancing themselves from ordinary 
people’s experiences and preoccupations. 
The older generation was able to produce a unity during the Franco years and against all 
odds, by agreeing that working class struggle was foremost a fight for democracy and 
against the dictatorship. During the Transition, all over Spain, the left very soon 
discovered the fragmentation produced by a battle around new interests and resources 
that often pit the old allies against each other. The popular saying “Contra Franco 
vivíamos mejor” [Against Franco we fared better], common by the early 1980s, 
expressed growing cleavages and the reconfiguration of the stakes at play. In Ferrol, the 
generation that reconstructed a unified class struggle during the 1960s is defined by the 
next generation (now in their forties) in ambiguous terms: they appear as an heroic 
group of people, a collection of significant personalities that were able to powerfully 
transmit their analysis of the situation and engage the solidarity of everyone in the 
region; they are also described as the “lost generation”, the generation that lost the 
transition challenge, the generation of unionists that were trapped literally in the 
industrial restructuring that destroyed the shipyards: they lost their jobs while the 
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increasingly fragmented structures of production impaired the capacity of unions to 
organize. 
In any case, there is a general agreement in seeing the present as a loss in relation, first, 
to the unfulfilled expectations of the Transition; second, in relation to what did get 
accomplished in those years in respect to the rights of workers and civil liberties; third, 
in relation to the promised stabilization of the economic situation after the tough years 
of restructuring; and fourth in relation to the unity and solidarity of the workers’ 
movement during the dictatorship. As a retired worker who had a son working in one of 
the subcontract auxiliary firms for the shipyard put it: 
“In the last twenty years workers have lost 40% of their conquests. People 
work without social security, without labor security. Young people have to 
accept precarious jobs, dangerous jobs in the shipyards. The unions cannot 
do much in the small auxiliary firms, workers don’t find support when they 
have a problem, there is competition among workers and there is no 
solidarity. But these are all workers’ problems...” M. B., 2003). 
The precarity that the young generation endures appears here as the mirror of a double 
loss, that of the social and labor conquests that were obtained through hard struggles, 
and that of the capacity for engaging in that form of struggle in the present, for lack of 
solidarity. Indeed the youngest generation, in their twenties, is also defined as a “lost 
generation” in that their fragmentation is complete and their confidence gone. They are 
individualists, they go it alone. They don’t trust the unions because they see them as 
corrupt. In the words of Juli, in his late twenties and a union member: “Mine is an 
unbelieving generation. Politics is of no use to solve problems. Everything remains the 
same whoever is in power (gobierne quien gobierne).” (J., 2007). This disbelief is an 
expression of the failure of the heroic generation that produced a strong working class 
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union during the dictatorship. It underscores their failure to produce a real democracy, 
where “politics” –institutional channels and representatives-- would make a difference. 
It very explicitly refers to their defeat in material terms –what they did not, in the end, 
accomplish. But it also refers to their inability to transmit their values, their tools of 
analysis, their conscience and their consciousness to the next generations. Above all, it 
points to their shortcomings to transmit the capacity for struggle. The clear sentiment 
that, as María said, “Perhaps we have been unable to transmit it” (M., 2005) gets 
repeated over and over by the elders as a “mea culpa”. These difficulties of transmission 
are in part related to the consequences of the restructuring period on the training system 
of the shipyard, that dismantled  the apprentice school and the mentorship process that 
had structured intergenerational knowledge transfers within the factory. Indeed, for the 
older generation, this mentorship system is described as crucial in their political 
initiation: they learned the trade together with particular ways of analyzing their 
position in the world.  
The import substitution period of the dictatorship, and the particular structure of state 
industries that were considered “strategic”  for the development and security of the 
nation (energy, steel, chemicals, coal, and military industries) created the perfect space 
for transmission. Because these industries required specialized workers, training was 
provided in “apprenticeship schools” (escuelas de aprendices) within the factory. 
Instruction seems to have been excellent in many accounts although infused with 
Falangist rituals and ideology. The last two years (out of four spent in apprenticeship) 
were spent learning the trade by teaming with senior mentors in the shipyard 
workshops. Workers speak of it as a “University” (sic) where, together with the 
practicalities of the trade, they learned about past history, politics, society and culture. 
There was a clandestine library in the shipyard were they could read forbidden works 
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(in their words: “From Marx to Lorca”). Here they found the transmission of memories 
of struggle, they learned about labor strikes during the Republic (1934), they learned 
about confrontations among the left during the Revolution and the Civil War (1938), 
learned about the repression that was particularly devastating in the area, but also about 
anti-colonial struggles abroad, about civil rights movements, etc. All of it contributed to 
a widening of their understandings of conflict and to the capacity to address more 
abstract scales of struggle.  Moreover, this was not only a theoretical transmission of 
knowledge but one that was put to practice constantly through the analysis of present 
day situations and the design for action and solidarity with other mobilizations. Some of 
these mentors in the shipyard have become heroic symbols (Julio Aneiros,  for example, 
who was defined as a mentor by many was a member of the clandestine communist 
party and a key actor in the reorganization of a class based union in the 1960s). One can 
easily follow the lineages of mentorship up to the present because all politically active 
workers will voice them explicitly. The vocational school was transformed into a short-
term training space in the 1980s when workers were hired already holding degrees from 
technical schools, and was finally closed in the early1990s, coinciding with the second 
restructuring period. The shipyard space (Bazán) remained for a while the working class 
“University” through the union activism of the restructuring years making transmission 
of “social conscience” still possible. However, after the second wave of restructuring 
was finished, in the late 1990s, two generations of mentors had disappeared and the 
structure of the industry was fragmented in a multitude of small auxiliary firms which 
were positioned differently in the physical and social space of shipbuilding. For Raúl, 
the early retirement aspect of restructuring was planned as to separate the leaders that 
had been active during the Transition from the following generations of workers. It 
sought to disrupt transmission chains and it succeeded. 
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In these circumstances, their reading of history situates the generation who struggled 
during the dictatorship as losers, even when they thought they had accomplished their 
objective by attaining democracy and what came with it: free unions, the legalization of 
the communist party and civil rights. 
 
Suffering 
The material aspects of this loss are the basis for what they define as “suffering”. This 
concept refers to the embodied realities of being part of the working class and it reveals 
an important aspect of the structures of feeling that can be shared and mobilized to 
produce a collective identity. For an industrial town such as Ferrol, the restructuring 
periods of the 1980s and 1990s, had a major impact on the livelihoods of most 
households. This has produced a pervasive sense of fear (miedo) and pain. In the context 
of recent political and economic transformations the meaning of fear has changed from 
a mostly political12 to a mostly economic value form while retaining a logic of 
dismantling organized working-class struggle: from fear of repression during Franco, to 
fear of economic destitution in the present. Those with permanent employment are 
afraid of losing their jobs. They are afraid the shipyard won’t get any new orders and 
the menace of total closure looms. Casual workers are afraid of not being re-hired. 
Workers in the small auxiliary firms are afraid these will shut down, move elsewhere or 
find a cheaper workforce. During the year 2012, more that 1000 direct jobs were lost, all 
of them in the auxiliary companies that are subcontracted to work in the shipyard. 
Precarity is becoming widespread and young people are increasingly dependent on 
subsidies or migrate.13 Parents are afraid their children won’t get proper jobs or any 
jobs at all and that they will have to leave, as many are doing. Many households live off
the pensions of the workers that were forced into early retirement. In between 
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precarious jobs people live from unemployment benefits. They are afraid the State will
cut down social benefits and this is indeed occurring with the structural adjustment cuts 
imposed by the European Commission since 2011. Young people cannot leave their 
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“There are very few casual workers that are unionized, because of fear. 
Nobody wants to go in the list [of the union] because you have to show your
face and confront the company. We are moving back in time. They want to 
destroy the stability conquered by the labor movement. When you see that
you are afraid. You live to the limits. You live with fear. Y
dream of having a child or of buying a car.” (J. C., 2006). 
For a town that had stable employment and accomplished gains in social benefits for 
almost half a century this has come as a shock. Indeed it has come as a counter intuitive
reality: democracy has led to a disaster situation in their material economic conditions, 
but also in that institutional channels allegedly opened to facilitate the struggle to gain
control over their lives, have in fact become dead-ends. “People are afraid: those that 
are meant to defend you are not going to defend you” says Xaime, a radical union leader 
(2006). He then describes how political parties are only interested in getting powe
have lost touch with ordinary people’s problems, and they don’t care. Unions are 
bureaucratized, and they lack an alternative project. They submit to the arguments of 
employers (labor market de-regulation, increases in productivity, job flexibilit
the state’s macroeconomic analysis and neoliberal projects. They are seen as 
profiteering from the fragmented and precarious labor market structure, where they 
increasingly function as a “placing agency” using clientelist procedures, throu
statutory participation in the Instituto Nacional de Empleo (INEM) [National 
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Employment Institute], and make money through their control over occupational 
retraining courses tied to unemployment benefits. In fact, the participation of trade 
unions, together with the employers’ associations, in the national institutions r
with employment and retraining programs was a result of the neo-corporatist 
agreements during the early 1980s as a trade-off for accepting restructuring policies.  
The relative power of unions as an institution in the official employment organisms sets
union bureaucrats in a patron-client relation with the mass of ordinary members, and 
protects unions against internal democracy and discourages dissidence within, while 
another form of fear creeps in. Xaime, leader of a critical faction (Trotskyite) of the 
major union Comisiones Obreras (CCOO-Críticos), explains a recent conflict in an 
auxiliary company. Five groups of workers (totaling around sixty individuals) starte
legal action against the main shipbuilding company Navantia (the old Bazán, state 
owned) on the grounds of “labor lending” [prestamismo laboral], a form of illegal 
subcontracting where de facto employee-employer relations are with the main company 
and not with the subcontractor. With this legal action, workers had bypassed the union
who didn’t like this. The nationalist union Confederación Intersindical Galega (CIG) 
tried to dissuade them and, confronted by their decisiveness, told them not to use the 
legal frame of “collective conflict” but to present demands individually, which they did
and lost their cases. In Xaime’s opinion, the union committee assumes the pro
model based on subcontracting, and supports the company’s decisions while 
monopolizing collective action. However, he understands the issue as a structural on
reflecting the fact that unions have not been able to organize the auxiliary industry 
(whose individual firm size is too small) into a strong unified union movement that 
jointly addresses the problems of auxiliaries. The unions in these private firms need to 











the “principal”) because they are an integral part of it irrespective of the legal 
fragmentation. Their problems are articulated and the struggle should be coordinate












e critical Trotskyite magazine El Militante14 expressed:  
“This strike reveals an important aspect: that the auxiliary companies are 
now part of the labor movement of this factory in equal footing with those 
of the principal. (...) It is imperative that (...) a coordinating committee of 
auxiliary companies is instituted that enables to address their problems in a
global manner and that holds the representation of all the companies. T
will also permit a better coordination with the union committee in the 
principal, s
original).  
But this unity is yet to materialize. This real pain of fear and betrayal is compared with 
other forms of suffering in the past. The suffering of the heroic generation fighting th
Franco police: many were tortured and imprisoned, some died when demonstrations 
were repressed (1972). Women talk about the suffering of the wives of these fighter
who lost their men as husbands and fathers to the demanding hours and dangers of 
political struggle. This created an intimate distress within the family produced by the 
tension between what women perceived as the abstract collective fight of men, versu
their own personal immediate struggles to get by everyday. Most shipyard workers’ 
spouses were  fulltime housewives. Their view of the struggle differed markedly from 
that of working women in other local industries, such as canneries (see Narotzky 2010)
The latter fought with their comrades in the battlefront while the former preserved the 
rearguard in an ambivalent space between the intimacies of family reproduction and the 
public militancy of support to the fighters (providing for them and the family while they
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were in prison, for example). The difference between past and present suffering seems 
to be one of purpose. Then, suffering was directed toward an identifiable goal, it w
part of the struggle, it led towards a better future, it was worth it. Suffering now, 
however, appears as a function of defeat, of passive acceptance of what
as 









ecomes a means to an end: “Without sacrifice there is no victory” (C. F., 2010) 
overwhelming forces: the market, the economy, the European Union.  
Faced with the betrayal of institutions, workers try to explain what is amiss, when
why their elected representatives stopped caring for them and how to redress the
situation. The major point that is underlined over and over is that these elected 
representatives lost touch with the immediate reality of work and hardship. This is 
explained as a result of being given time-off and even total release from work when 
they became officially elected union leaders, a legally recognized right that is meant to 
compensate for the hours dedicated to union work. The argument is that they lost touch
from ordinary hardship when they got paid for being union representatives, when the
started thinking of themselves as “politicians” instead of workers. Social distancing 
mirrored spatial separation, office work instead of work in the slip or the workshops. 
And in the process they “lost their soul” because they did not suffer what their fellow 
workers suffered, they became part of
are alienated from the rank-and-file.  
But suffering also has its positive side. Those in the younger generation who try to
organize some sense of collective purpose put suffering as the cornerstone of any 
possible unity, they say: “In order to struggle and make things better one must suffer 
them” (J. P., 2007) or “People believe in those that suffer with them” (M. C., 2010). So
collective suffering, the shared embodiment of work and hardship, is seen as being the 





The last aspect involved in creating the structures of feeling of workers in Ferrol is 
struggle itself, as it participates in the production of a collective identity that can be 
mobilized for transforming reality. Struggles waged in the present refer to past mod
collective identity formation both as models to follow and as warning of pitfalls t
avoid. Present struggles, however, have to confront new forms of cleavages that 
fragment the subaltern classes to
es of 
o 







1981], Harvey 2001). Various forces contribute to form 
produce coherence and unity?  
We have seen how present day fragmentation of the production structure tog
the opening to a competitive market from the 1980s onward and the rise of 
unemployment, casual and precarious jobs, has run parallel with the institutionaliza
of political and labor conflicts, the hegemony of macroeconomics and a culture of 
“concertación” [agreements]. As a result, previous, institutionalized forms of collective 
identity such as classical trade unionism have lost public confidence. On the other han
there are increasing reasons to mobilize: as workers in the face of a consistent l
rights and employment opportunities, as citizens in the face of life threatening 
environmental assaults, as ordinary people in the face of the difficulty to make 
All of these issues could be analyzed and framed in seemingly simple political 
economic terms producing a structure of common positionalities. However, people 
experience these commonalities in a particular and fragmented way, from within a 
structure of feeling embedded in place and personal hardship. Militant particularism
pervasive (Williams 1989 [
particularized solidarities. 
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The first one is localism, bounding the space for action to those that suffer a part
aggression. An example of this is the Comité Ciudadano de Emergencia [Citizen’s 
Emergency Committee], a citizen’s committee including various neighborhood 
associations, cultural entities and environmental justice activist networks that was
formed to oppose the construction of a Natural Gas Plant inside the bay of Ferrol. Th
plant was dangerous and didn’t comply with EU security regulations, and it was 
destructive of the marine environment and thus imperiled the livelihood of she
gatherers. For more than ten years, this committee has been waging a struggle on the 
juridical front, through institutional dialogue and confrontation, and in street 
demonstrations. The movement although formally united is extremely heterogeneous,
with interests ranging from issues of fear of accidental injury, to discontent about t
loss of value of adjoining property, to the stress over loss of livelihood opportu
attached to destruction of marine environment, to very general claims of political 
corruption (Narotzky 2007). This in itself marks clear lines of cleavage in the 
movement. But the main issue is the inability of the movement to “jump scales” (
1993), that is to frame their plight in a larger framework, for example, that of general 
environmental justice which would link them to other national and international 
movements (such as Greenpeace). The argument of the leaders of the movement is that 
they need to combine very different interests, in order to have a large backing locally. 
Opting for greater abstraction and a wider framing scale would immediately lose them 
local support. Because the movement of abstraction tends to select a particular aspect










order to define a general logic of process, it would inevitably marginalize or 
ent even antagonize those local participants that explain the problem through a differ
reasoning.  
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This argument is fraught with ambivalence, however, as the main leaders of the 
Citizen’s Committee are the heroes of the shipyard struggles of the 1960s that have 
found new struggles after getting early retirement in the 1990s. While they g
tend to make their analysis in terms of class, in this particular struggle their strateg
aims at inclusion, at keeping together a heterogeneous collective that has a unitary aim 
but a fragmented motivation. They also navigate the tension
enerally 
y 
 of their former 











movement speak of the strategy and tactics the old leaders propose both with admiratio
and with skepticism, but do not challenge it significantly.  
 
A second and related form of particularization is at play in the framing of the terms of
conflict. In Ferrol this is expressed by economic nationalism, the idea that the plight of
workers is tied to that of firms and employers in the region of Galicia. Economic 
nationalism is part of an ambivalent past. Strands of economic nationalism appear at 
different historical moments during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Arguably, 
the autarkic project, followed by the import substitution period of the dictatorship 
lasted until 1957 was a nationalist economic project and it produced the growth of such 
“stable” industries as the nationalized shipyard Bazán. A different strand of ec
nationalism is found in the late nineteenth century as Galician intellectuals, often 
following a traditional catholic corporatist perspective, developed corporatist argume
for a national identity, seeking increased autonomy from the central Spanish 
government (Afredo Brañas, one of the founders of “regionalismo” [regionalism
inspired by equivalent traditionalist bourgeois movements in Catalonia). Duri
transition, in the 1970s, a radical left version of economic nationalism was central to
development of  the nationalist party (Bloque Nacional Galego, BNG) and the 
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nationalist union (Confederación Intersindical Galega, CIG). Here economic 
nationalism was based on a center-periphery analysis of Galician position in worl
economic systems, also addressing the need to define a Galician centered political 











n order to 
 
locally. With the others, capital goes away.” (J. C., 2006).  
15 In the present, this party (B
evolved into a party more accommodating with the interests of capital, while its 
founding leader, Xosé Manuel Beiras, has gone to found a radical left party, Ano
2012.16 Economic nationalism, therefore has different political declinations. 
Nevertheless, in everyday prac
local employers’ arguments for the need of rationalization. This is presented as 
“common sense” by the nationalist party BNG and trade union CIG, but also by t
leaders in other major unions. 
 in the small local auxiliary firms often perceive competition with firms f
n Spain as the main threat to job stability. Juan a young worker in an 
ompany and member of the nationalist union (CIG) explains:  
“What people demand is to stay for a while in the same firm, they want
stability, not running around changing firms. But the main company keeps 
changing its contracts from one firm to the other. Now they are making 
contracts with companies in Madrid and the local companies don’t get 
anything. ... Outside firms move all the time, one day here, the other th
[Then the argument changes] What I don’t like is that they are destroying 
stable companies, with a stable labor pool, with workers who have been 
stable for 40 years [he is referring to the Nervión conflict], i
substitute them for companies where 90% of workers are precarious. [And 
finally concludes] Local employers have their capital here and they invest it
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With a similar argument the left wing of the nationalist party Bloque Nacional Gale
insists on the need to defend the 
go 









ployer. Often also, they know that the local employer expands his 
siness outside the region and makes subsidiaries of the company abroad that compete 
ith the local firm.  
don’t move to other regions.17 Xosé Manuel Beiras described it as a re-
f Galician economy: 
“We need to center the dynamics of Galician economy in itself –which does 
not mean isolating it; we need to strengthen its internal flows, densify its 
productive fabric, put an end to the extraversion of our growth potential; we
need to reinvest within Galicia its economic surplus, and regulate financial
circuits in relation to t
nervous centers where the private entrepreneurial fabric is absent or frail” 
(XM Beiras, 2000)18 
The idea is that the future of the worker depends on the future of local firms, so th
the face of global competitive pressures, a corporatist  approach is the better so
all. And as a corollary some of the classic corporatist themes reemerge: workers 
demands have to recede in the face of supporting competitiveness of Galician 
companies, class conflict has to be superseded. Here the argument for unity and strug
is couched in the bounding of an imagined community allegedly sharing “the same” 
interest for the common wellbeing, irrespective of position in the political economic 
structure. This argument produces a lot of tension and internal contradiction within the 
rank-and-file of the unions, as workers have to negotiate struggling for better conditions 






A third form of militant particularism tries, paradoxically, to transcend particularity and
reach a universal level of abstraction to frame conflict. For workers, the awareness of a 
larger structure encompassing local developments is easier to grasp in the larger firms 
and generally enables shop stewards to analyze situations and engage struggles in class
terms. The case of Pull & Bear’s logistics department, part of the Zara-Inditex clothing 











t provided the instruments for 
19 the major Galician company, wanted to invest locally. Attracte
the good conditions of the industrial park of Narón (in the Ferrol conurbation) t
established there the central logistic hub for their Pull & Bear brand. This was a 
company with no union tradition and it arrived in a region in decline with few 
employment expectations. But they hired young workers who were, in the words of 
José, the “sons of the shipyard”: “they had a tradition” which they used to organize a 
section of the main union CCOO and eventually waged a strike for better social and 
working conditions that ended successfully. The “tradition” they relate to is not onl
about the tactics of mobilization, but very much about the analysis of concrete issues in 
terms of a logic of accumulation, framed in political economy understanding. The 
section that engaged mobilization in Pull & Bear is part of the Trotskyite faction of t
union Comisiones Obreras (CCOO-Críticos); they have regular meetings where the
study classic texts (Marx, Luxemburg, Trotsky) and analyze present day events and 
conflicts. They collaborate actively in the journal El Militante where they provide 
analysis of the economic situation and ongoing conflicts in the region. There aim is 
revolutionary and their work is to get workers to think beyond particularism, get th
“jump scales” and define the real adversary. José, however, admits that it was difficult 
to unionize workers. This younger generation of trade unionists see themselves as 
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stitutions that produced the 
 
ast conflicts drawing particular 
e scale of conflict. To them the union resembles a small business and is 
 alienated from the workers.  José explains:  
“The institutional leadership of the union is incapable of struggle; they only 
know how to negotiate, make deals. The feeling is that the bureaucracy of 
the union is stopping us but the way to get things is through struggle. People
are tired of putting up with the situation. This is a new generation of young 
people that does not bear the failure
how the union manages things. There is no real authority in the union. But 
people are learning.” (J. P., 2006). 
For José, the need for struggle is present because labor conditions are deteriorating bu
the union leadership has alienated itself from struggle by making deals, although it is 
still a useful structure to infiltrate. For this young activist, the previous generation of 
shipyard workers is both an example to follow and one to avoid. It is a “tradition” t
enlightens as to the capacity of collective struggle and possible strategies: it situate
them in a lineage as “the sons of the shipyard”. But it is also the
ultimate failure of the class unions, co-opted by the in
practice of “agreements” and enclosed the spaces for struggle.  
Collective identities, memories and struggles  
What then can we conclude from these experiences in Ferrol? As in many other areas of 
de-industrializing Europe, struggles in twenty-first century Ferrol are very different 
from what they were in the past century. They have become increasingly particularized
and fragmented in different ways. They trace links to p
lessons from both positive and negative interpretations that in turn help configure the 
grounds for present day collective identity formation.  
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The three axes I have presented –defeat, suffering and struggle—produce a dense fabric 
of connections and disconnections among and between ordinary subaltern people in 
Ferrol. Through the dimensions of time and space we can follow the production of 
conjunctions and disjunctions, of continuities, momentary blockages and dead-end
can also perceive how different levels of intimacy and distancing, of concreteness and 
abstraction produce tensions that real people have to negotiate everyday. It might be 
easy for the anthropologist observing this reality from a certain distance – which 
inevitably favors objectification - to define what is going on in terms of, for example, 
the internalization of abstract processes and logics. But this is not a possibility for those 
fully engaged in living their life, making sense of it and fighting for a better future. A
Raymond Williams (1989 [1977]) and Eric Hobsbawm (1984 [1971]) both pointed o
abstraction and organization are necessary to “jump scales” (in Neil Smith’s terms) in
the framing of a particular conflict in order to render it more universal and possibly 
more transformative of the structures. Simultaneously, however, this is a process of 
reification, where “relations between men are made into relations between things or 
relations between concepts” (Williams 1989 [1977]: 117; cf. also Harvey’s analysis 
2001). So if we want to respond to our initial question “What kinds of collectives need 
to be produced in order to achieve a radical transformation of capitalist relations of 






sion between the forces that produce militant particularism and those that are 
 a used to produce abstraction and expand the scale of organization and struggle. This is
tension that cannot easily be resolved in either sense for two distinct albeit related 
reasons.  
The first is of an empirical nature, in that experience is always unique, and although 
interpersonal sharing, verbalization and action produce commonality (Thompson 1966) 
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there is a limit to the extension of this collective identification, of what Raymond 
Williams (1989 [1977])  called the “simple affirmation, affirmation with extension” o
community. Further extension always requires a degree of abstraction that implies a lo
of perceived realism, a “negation” of experience, while simultaneously extending the 
leverage of our experience and understanding. Some material realities, however, are 
shared in a more homogeneous way and conducive to easier generalization although, 
often, one only superficially based on an abstract understanding of the logics struct
these shared experiences. This was the case of the Civil War confrontation when the 
conflict was simplified as opposing two factions those fighting for democracy and
against it, which was translated in the opposing camp as those fighting to save the 
Christian fatherland (the rebel armies of Franco) and those destroying it (the socialis
and laic republicans). Later, during the Franco regime’s violent repression of the 














among those opposing the regime. In both of these cases, dispossession was felt in a 
very direct and material way by the Left all over Spain, producing solidarity and 
identity.  
It was also the case, in a different way, of the post-war industrial and economic polic
that favored the development of Fordism in key sectors of industry which created 
commonality in work experience and the reconstruction of a class trade unionism. 
unionism in the context of a dictatorship was able to understand and organize labor 
struggle as key to the political struggle to transform society. The period of industrial
restructuring and neo-liberal expansion from the 1980s onwards, on the opposite,
produced a material experience of dispossession –of employment, skills, securi
was paradoxically presented by those “representing” workers (Socialist party, trade 
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union leaders) as a positive program –European economic integration, increased 
competitiveness, growth that would bring employment, etc.—in a language of 
“agreements” and rational and responsible politics, where legitimate confrontation was 
always represented as limited to localized issues, not systemic ones. Here, a sense of 







struggle of the transition produced an effect of retrenchment into immediate experience, 
as opposed to a formalized organization that was becoming estranged and difficult to 
understand. 
The second reason why  the tensions between militant particularism and the abstracti
necessary to expand the scale of organization and struggle is not easily resolved is of a 
theoretical nature that can be elaborated via the insights of Henri Lefebvre (1972). 
While particularism and fragmentation are the facts of life, so are commonality an
unity, depending on the level of abstraction and on the time and scale frames we use to 
make sense of reality. In both the immediate and distanced analysis of real life we 
confront the following issue: What appears as fragmented is part of a unit but its 
imaginary fragmentation has real effects on the way the unit can be reproduced. In other
words, we can understand the unitary system of capitalist accumulation as producing 
different forms of fragmentation at different historical moments and in different 
localities, which are then part and parcel of that by which the unitary system crea
conditions of possibility for social reproduction (Wolf 1982). This is, in my op
deep sense of the concept of militant particularism that Raymond Williams proposes a
a form of struggle which tries to capture the reality of different scales operating 
simultaneously. It addresses the challenge to both acknowledge the “logic” of 
connections within the system, both time and space connections, without losing their 
particular expression and the experience that drives people to think in terms of a 
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community of interest. In Williams’ words: “the concept of a practical and possible 
general interest, which really does include all reasonable particular interests, has to be 
negotiated, found, agreed, constructed.” (1989 [1981]:255). It captures the immanent 
contradiction that Hobsbawm (1984 [1971]) struggled with when trying to define class 
consciousness at the two levels of “trade union” and of “socialist” consciousness, the 
latter linked to the development of “organization”, and formal institutions of leaders
The “lower level” consciousness of the more spontaneous trade union struggles, had to 
be complemented by a “higher level” consciousness produced by “organization” in a
purposeful manner (1984 [1971]:27-28). The necessary mediation of organization, 
however, produces a “divergence, between ‘class’ and ‘organization’” (1984 [1971
between class as experienced by people and the organization that gives it collective 




 capable of enacting policy (Hobsbawm 
 to 
bility” 
as erased, and the possibility for the unions of addressing 
1984 [1977]). This process of substitution and distancing through the structure of 
organization is both necessary to give “the people”  a “reality” and often an obstacle
immediate mobilization  (1984 [1977]:293).  
In the case I have presented, this seems to be so because the neo-corporatist transition 
“agreements” became so closely bound with neoliberal policy that they produced a 
wronging of the expectations of workers by those institutions representing the working-
class. The use of macroeconomic rationality and of pragmatic political “responsi
on the part of the unions and socialist party appeared as the ultimate “negation” of hard 
won organization and community in past struggles, and a blatant betrayal of immediate 
struggles. So that, in the end, scale was in fact negated, the tension between the 
particular and the universal w
the wrongs inflicted to the rank-and-file workers disappeared. In this conjuncture, 
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memory has become an instrument that reintroduces time and space scales in the 
attempt to organize struggle. 
In Ferrol people make various links between the past and the present. They see the 
present as an outcome of the past, as when the agreements reached by the unions during 
the restructuring conflict are explained as the prelude to present day precarity. They se
the present as the road to an imagined project in the future, when they define their 
struggles as aiming at a nationalist project of community, or at the possibility o
life in a safer environment. These connections and disconnections are a crucial element 
in the local expression of system
e 
f a better 








and cleavages that construct new collective identities and help redefine the conflicts tha
should be addressed. They generate a particular field of forces that creates the 
conditions of possibility for engaging in transformative struggles and, in so doing, se
the field of social reproduction. 
I think that as anthropologists we are in a particularly favorable position to exp
connection between the empirical nature of experience and the theoretical constr
developed both locally and by the distanced observer. The ways in which particular 
conflicts in Ferrol are being defined and struggles waged in the present, are deeply 
embedded in the way larger forces such as Francoist economic development, 
participation in the western bloc, neoliberal imperatives of European accession, 
liberalization of markets, etc. became fixed in a place and inscribed in the bodies of 
successive generations of men and women. And that is why the ways they still find to 
achieve commonalities appeal to place and body, and to the ties that bind them through 
time. The threads that situate them and commit them speak of the shipyard, the r
the lineages, and the suffering body. The realization that these elements of commonal
that produce militant particularism are widely shared is central to their ability to e
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and articulate collective identities. This might explain why suffering, as the immediate
homology that should unite all those that share the hardship of earning a living, 
becomes in the last instance the metonym they appeal to as their basic commonality. 
However, as they  go along the way trying to build coalitions that will help them 
achieve a better life, they need to find bridges that help negotiate the cleavages set by 
the various experiences of space and time. Some are negotiated through lineages 
bring together generations separated by disappointment; others are negotiated throug
notion of region/ nation that draws together different positions in the local econom
society; still others are negotiated through class pulling together those that live from a 
wage. All are only partial roads to inclusion through particular scale-frames that 





neously, and often impair struggle. Further 
e 
 of different scales on the other, are in 
y view the best methodological inroads to understanding this process.  On the ground 
however, this realization is expressed as a tension between structures without soul that 
along the way the challenge is to define a collective identity that might achieve a 
significant capacity to transform the overwhelming reality of defeat, loss and disbelief. 
Here, a level of abstraction that transcends particularism while expressing it has to b
found, clearly defined and transmitted.  
In Europe and elsewhere the larger forces of expanding capitalism have historically 
become inscribed in different ways. The value of difference for capitalist expansion is 
specific and place bound, therefore the common factor is that historically produced 
specificities are always exploited to the outmost by being reproduced as such. At the 
same time, the hegemony of macroeconomic thought infuses everyday experience with 
a transcendent reality. The focus on personal and social reproduction on the one hand, 
and the awareness of the simultaneous operation
m
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enable expanding the stakes of the struggle, and real people with the capacity to form 
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